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Note
A Spoonful of Sugarcane Ethanol: A Green Tax
Medicine for the Cellulosic Ethanol Industry
Ke M. Huang*
On July 31, 2013, INEOS Bio, a bioenergy company,1
announced that its Florida facility became the world pioneer in
producing commercial-scale cellulosic ethanol.2 Ethanol, or
ethyl alcohol,3 is a renewable fuel resulting from fermenting
plant-based materials.4 INEOS Bio produces cellulosic ethanol
using vegetative and yard waste.5
Despite the flurry that accompanied last July’s event,
Brazil is still regarded as the country that implemented the
most successful ethanol industry in the world6—the sugarcane
ethanol industry.
© 2014 Ke M. Huang
* JD Candidate, 2015, University of Minnesota Law School, MFA
UCLA, BS Syracuse University. I would like to thank the MJLST editors and
staff, especially Editor-in-Chief Caroline Marsili and Note & Comment Editor
Nihal Parkar, for their hard work on this Note. Outside the MJLST “fishbowl,”
I would like to thank Professor Goodwin, Ms. Rulin Li, Professor Monahan,
and Professor Rumsey for their insight. This Note would not have been
possible without the keen feedback and topical scholarship of my faculty
advisor, Professor Klass. Agradeço, too, my family for their unconditional
support. All errors, shortcomings, and lame Julie Andrews references are mine
only.
1.
Profile, INEOS BIO, http://www.ineos.com/en/businesses/INEOSBio/Company/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).
2. INEOS Bio Produces Cellulosic Ethanol at Commercial Scale, INEOS
BIO (July 31, 2013), http://www.ineos.com/en/businesses/INEOS-Bio/News/
INEOS-Bio-Produces-Cellulosic-Ethanol/ [hereinafter INEOS Bio].
3. L. Leon Geyer et al., Ethanol, Biomass, Biofuels and Energy: A Profile
and Overview, 12 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 61, 63 (2007).
4. David N. Cassuto & Carolina Gueiros, The Evolution of the Brazilian
Regulation of Ethanol and Possible Lessons for the United States, 30 WIS.
INT’L L.J. 477, 480 (2012).
5. INEOS Bio, supra note 2.
6. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1082–83
(9th Cir. 2013) (low carbon intensity); Roberta F. Mann & Mona L. Hymel,
Moonshine to Motorfuel: Tax Incentives for Fuel Ethanol, 19 DUKE ENVTL. L.

1117

1118

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:2

In the United States, the ethanol industry touches on two
critical areas. First, ethanol can be used as motor fuel,7 and it
is no secret that the United States relies on motor fuel.8
Second, the nation’s reliance on motor fuel, especially gasoline,
raises significant environmental concerns, notably, greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions.9
Thus, given the recent advancements in ethanol
production, and the critical areas that ethanol touches on, an
issue emerges as to whether Brazil’s ethanol policy model can
be instructive to the United States’ fledgling cellulosic ethanol
industry.
This Note seeks to suggest changes to the tax benefits of
the U.S. cellulosic ethanol industry. Part I will present,
primarily by focusing on federal tax policies and environmental
effects linked with ethanol, (1) the trajectory of the United
States’ corn and cellulosic ethanol industries; and (2) the
trajectory of Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol industry. Part II (1)
reviews the relevant existing literature addressing ethanol; (2)
compares and contrasts the federal ethanol tax benefits of the
United States’ and Brazil’s ethanol industries; (3) compares
and contrasts these industries’ impact on the respective
country’s environment; and (4) explains why Brazil’s tax
benefits should encourage the United States to implement
similar benefits. This Note concludes that revising some of the
U.S. cellulosic ethanol tax benefits, following Brazil’s ethanol
industry tax benefits, will likely spur the U.S. cellulosic ethanol
industry, which would ultimately result in significant
environmental benefits.

& POL’Y F. 43, 54 (2008) (cheaper to produce); Nancy I. Potter, Note, How
Brazil Achieved Energy Independence and the Lessons the United States
Should Learn from Brazil’s Experience, 7 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV.
331, 347–48 (2008) (efficient to produce).
7. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1088 (“Indeed, the
[fuel] market relies on th[e] undifferentiated structure [of ethanol] because
ethanol from different regions . . . is regularly mixed together in the fuel
supply.”).
8. Lincoln L. Davies, Alternative Energy and the Energy-Environment
Disconnect, 46 IDAHO L. REV. 473, 473–74, 507 (2010) (noting that Presidents
Bush and Obama stated that the United States is figuratively addicted to oil).
9. Cf. Alexandra B. Klass, Climate Change and the Convergence of
Environmental and Energy Law, 24 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 180, 196 (2013)
[hereinafter Klass, Climate Change] (describing a methodology of analyzing
motor fuel carbon emissions and their impact on the environment).
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ETHANOL TAX BENEFITS10: IS THE SUGARCANE
ALWAYS GREENER ON THE OTHER SIDE?11

Policymakers draw ethanol along several lines. Foremost,
ethanol is a class of biofuel—a fuel produced from biomass.12
Ethanol can also have a generation designation. Firstgeneration ethanol is fermented from biomass containing
simple sugars, such as cornstarch13 and sugarcane juice.14
Second-generation ethanol, or cellulosic ethanol,15 is fermented
from lignocellulosic biomass.16 Finally, ethanol, when used as a
motor fuel blend, is designated by a percentage figure. While
pure ethanol can serve as motor fuel in certain kinds of

10. “Ethanol tax benefits” encompass a wide range of terms ranging from
direct subsidies to fiscal regulations that indirectly favor the ethanol industry,
and all of the tax incentives that fall in between. For example, Brazil’s
Contribuição de Intervenção no Domínio Econômico is a federal tax that
implicitly benefits Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol industry by taxing gasoline
importers at much higher rates than its ethanol counterparts. Cassuto &
Gueiros, supra note 4, at 490. See generally Alexandra B. Klass, Tax Benefits,
Property Rights, and Mandates: Considering the Future of Government
Support for Renewable Energy 5–6 (Univ. of Minn. Law Sch. Legal Studies
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 13-11, 2013) [hereinafter Klass,
Tax Benefits], available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2222987 (describing U.S.
tax benefits for various kinds of renewable energy).
11. For U.S. state ethanol policies, see, for example, Rocky Mountain
Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1104 n.14. For Brazilian state ethanol policies,
see, for example, Paulina Calfucoy, The Brazilian Experience in Building a
Sustainable and Competitive Biofuel Industry, 30 WIS. INT’L L.J. 558, 591–93
(2012).
12. “Biomass” (which some commentators call “feedstock”) is organic
material used to produce biofuels. E.g., Vincent Barbera, Comment, Tomorrow
Today? Cellulosic Ethanol: How It’s Done, Who’s Getting It Done, and Its
Environmental Impact, 20 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 27, 30 (2009) (describing
cellulosic biomass). Other than ethanol, biofuels include biodiesel “and other
renewable liquid fuels.” U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., BIOFUELS ISSUES AND
TRENDS 1 (2012), available at http://www.eia.gov/biofuels/issuestrends/pdf/
bit.pdf.
13. Melissa Powers, King Corn: Will the Renewable Fuel Standard
Eventually End Corn Ethanol’s Reign, 11 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 667, 675 (2010).
14. CONSTANZA VALDES, USDA, BRAZIL’S ETHANOL INDUSTRY: LOOKING
FORWARD 7 (2011).
15. Powers, supra note 13, at 675.
16. “Lignocellulosic” biomass encompasses “crops, trees, forest residues,
and agricultural residues not specifically grown for food.” Energy Policy Act of
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 932, 119 Stat. 594, 870; cf. Am. Petroleum Inst. v.
EPA, 706 F.3d 474, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (“[C]ellulosic biofuel [is] an advanced
fuel derived from sources of lignocellulose, such as switchgrass and
agricultural wastes . . . .”). For an explanation of third-generation ethanol, see
Powers, supra note 13, at 676.
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vehicles,17 legislation addressing ethanol mostly concerns
gasoline and ethanol blends.18 These blends are abbreviated as
“E,” followed by a figure that denotes the percentage of ethanol
blended in the motor fuel.19
A. THE UNITED STATES
In the United States, the corn and cellulosic ethanol
industries are in many ways distinct in terms of federal policy
programs and environmental effects.
1. Corn Ethanol
Though the corn ethanol industry is distinct from the
cellulosic ethanol industry, a discussion of cellulosic ethanol
would be incomplete without mentioning corn ethanol.20 First,
corn ethanol dominates the U.S. ethanol industry.21 Not only is
the United States the world’s largest consumer22 and exporter23
of ethanol, but almost all the ethanol produced in the United
States uses corn as biomass.24 In addition, ethanol consumers
generally cannot distinguish between different varieties of
ethanol, because the varieties are often blended in the same
gallon of motor fuel.25
In 2011, the U.S. corn ethanol production totaled about
13.9 billion gallons,26 most of it produced in the Midwest.27

17. VALDES, supra note 14, at 2–3.
18. See, e.g., Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir.
2012) (describing the U.S. Renewable Fuel Standard, which has the effect of
increasing the U.S. national gasoline and ethanol blends); Cassuto & Gueiros,
supra note 4, at 489 (describing a 2003 Brazilian law that mandated that
twenty-two percent of the motor fuel in Brazil be blended with ethanol).
19. For example, E10 means a motor fuel blended with ten percent
ethanol. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 172.
20. See Matthew L. Wald, Fuel from Waste, Poised at a Milestone, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 14, 2012, at B1 [hereinafter Wald, Fuel from Waste] (quoting a
spokesperson of a biotechnology trade organization stating that it is
impossible to “de-link” ethanol and advanced biofuels); About BIO,
BIOTECHNOLOGY INDUS. ORG., http://www.bio.org/articles/about-bio (last
visited Mar. 2, 2014).
21. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n, 693 F.3d at 172 (“[R]efiners and importers
primarily blend corn-based ethanol into the fuel supply.”).
22. VALDES, supra note 14, at 16.
23. Id. at 18.
24. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 12, at 6.
25. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1088 (9th
Cir. 2013).
26. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., supra note 12, at 6.
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Critics of corn ethanol identify concerns with ethanol
production in at least two areas—the democratic process and
the environment.28
a. Federal Tax Benefits and Related Policies
The impetus of Congress’s implementation of the most
recent federal corn-ethanol tax benefits and related policies
was the 1970s oil crises that resulted from political turmoil in
certain Middle Eastern countries.29 In the first oil crisis in the
early 1970s, the U.S. gasoline consumers experienced shortages
and retail price hikes of about 40%.30 In the second crisis, in
the late 1970s, retail prices increased about 30%.31 In response,
Congress sought to spur corn ethanol—along with natural gas
and other biofuels—to encourage energy independence.32 While
later federal corn ethanol policies also addressed other goals,
notably environmental goals such as reduction of air
pollutants33 and GHG emissions,34 energy independence goals
have remained in the foreground of many policies.35
Other than corn ethanol tax benefits, major related federal
policies include the Oxygenated Fuels, Reformulated Gasoline
(RFG), and Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) programs.36 Until

27. See Ethanol Facilities’ Capacity by State, NEB. ENERGY OFF.,
http://www.neo.ne.gov/statshtml/121.htm (last visited Mar. 2, 2014) (listing
the seven highest ranked states, all located in the Midwest, which operated at
a production of about 10.4 billion gallons).
28. See infra Part I.A.1.a–.b.
29. James A. Duffield et al., Ethanol Policy: Past, Present, and Future, 53
S.D. L. REV. 425, 427–28 (2008).
30. Id. at 427.
31. Id. at 428.
32. Id.; Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 44 (“In 1978, Congress enacted
the first tax incentives for ethanol production to reduce dependence on foreign
oil.”).
33. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 430.
34. Id. at 439. “Greenhouse gas emissions” have been well recognized as
the main contributor to global warming. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,
504–05 (2007). GHGs include carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and
hydrofluorocarbons. Id. at 510, 529. While the U.S. Supreme Court held in
Massachusetts v. EPA that a statutory definition of “air pollutant” could
encompass GHGs, id. at 528–29, for the sake of clarity, this Note provides an
independent analysis of air pollutants—such as traditional pollutants from
tailpipe emissions—and GHG emissions. Accord Duffield et al., supra note 29,
at 449–50.
35. E.g., Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110140, 121 Stat. 1492 (emphasis added).
36. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 52–53.
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January 2012, the main ethanol tax benefit was the Volumetric
Ethanol Excise Tax Credit, which offered a $0.45 per gallon
credit37 to blenders that mix corn ethanol in motor fuel.38
Additionally, small producers39 could be eligible for an
additional $0.10 per gallon.40
The Oxygenated Fuels Program, designed to control carbon
monoxide (CO) during winter months, requires motor fuel to
contain at least 2.7% oxygen content.41 This goal was often
achieved by mixing motor fuel with at least 7.5% of ethanol.42
In December 2010, all targeted areas achieved federal ambient
air standards for CO.43
The RFG Program, eliminated in 2005, required motor fuel
to contain at least 2% of oxygen44 as to reduce harmful tailpipe
emissions.45 As with the Oxygenated Fuels Program, in
practice, the RFG Program mainly used ethanol.46
Finally, the RFS, the dominant corn ethanol policy in
effect,47 mandates, in broad terms, for the EPA to promulgate48
a renewable fuel phase-in.49 The RFS, introduced in the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 and incorporated in the Clean Air Act,50 was
amended in the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007

37. A “tax credit” is a kind of tax benefit that reduces a taxpayer’s tax
liability dollar-for-dollar. JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF
FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 873 (17th ed. 2013).
38. Klass, Tax Benefits, supra note 10, at 8.
39. The Internal Revenue Code defined “small producer” as having a
capacity not exceeding sixty million gallons per year. Mann & Hymel, supra
note 6, at 48–49.
40. Id. at 48.
41. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 447.
42. Id.
43. YANN LING-BARNES, WASHOE COUNTY HEALTH DEP’T, 2011–2012
OXYGENATED FUELS PROGRAM FOR WASHOE COUNTY 1 (2012), available at
http://www.washoecounty.us/repository/files/4/2011-2012-Oxy-Fuel-ReportApril-2012.pdf.
44. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 448.
45. Id. at 447. These harmful tailpipe emissions include CO, ground-level
ozone, and other pollutants. Id. at 448.
46. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 52.
47. See Klass, Tax Benefits, supra note 10, at 8 (“While Congress allowed
the bulk of the tax credits for biofuels to expire at the end of 2011, this action
did not meet with significant resistance from the biofuels industry primarily
because of the [RFS].”).
48. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 706 F.3d 474, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
49. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 435.
50. Grocery Mfrs. Ass’n v. EPA, 693 F.3d 169, 172 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
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(EISA)51 partly to address the environmental concerns
resulting from corn ethanol.52 The RFS allows qualifying motor
fuel suppliers to blend up to fifteen billion gallons of corn
ethanol per year.53
Several scholars argue that, especially with the phasing
out of corn-ethanol tax benefits, the RFS has been the main
federal policy in spurring corn ethanol production.54 When the
RFS was first introduced, corn ethanol made up less than 4% of
the amount of motor fuel volume; in 2011, the amount rose to
about 10.6%.55
Scholars also posit that corn ethanol implicates interests
that undermine representative democracy. Iowa, the leading
ethanol-producing state and the first state to hold a
presidential primary, is often the platform where presidential
candidates vouch support for ethanol.56 Some commentators
assert that ethanol production only benefits a few big
agribusinesses.57
b. Environmental Effects
Experts in scientific and policy-making fields have
assessed the environmental effect of corn ethanol production in
terms of GHG emissions, air pollutant emissions, and land use.
Although corn ethanol was important to the air pollutant
reduction legislative goals in the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1990,58 ever since 2007, the efficacy of corn ethanol with regard
to its GHG-emission reduction has been under attack. When
employing the lifecycle analysis to find carbon intensity of
different varieties of ethanol,59 corn ethanol is found to be more

51. Am. Petroleum Inst., 706 F.3d at 475.
52. Klass, Tax Benefits, supra note 10, at 24.
53. Powers, supra note 13, at 695.
54. E.g., Klass, Tax Benefits, supra note 10, at 24–25; Powers, supra note
13, at 705–07.
ECON.
RES.
SERVICE,
55. Bioenergy:
Background,
USDA
http://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/farm-economy/bioenergy/background.aspx#
.Um17nJR-RN0 (last updated May 27, 2012).
56. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 73.
57. E.g., id. at 72; Powers, supra note 13, at 685–86.
58. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 431; see supra notes 44–46 and
accompanying text.
59. “Lifecycle analysis” can address a kind of ethanol’s “carbon intensity,”
i.e., the GHG emissions resulting from production and transportation of a kind
of ethanol. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1080 (9th
Cir. 2013); see also Klass, Climate Change, supra note 9, at 196–97.
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carbon-intensive than, for example, sugarcane ethanol.60 In
addition, some researchers point to the relationship between
higher GHG emissions and indirect land use changes.61
According to these researchers, because increases in corn prices
encourage developing countries to convert rainforests and
peatlands for agricultural production (or even for biofuel
production), and these previously nonagricultural lands can no
longer be as effective in sequestering GHGs, this course of
events leads to higher GHG emissions.62
While Congress passed legislation favorable to corn
ethanol to abate automobile air pollutant emissions,63 empirical
data have not fully confirmed corn ethanol’s effectiveness in
abating these emissions. Growing corn could threaten public
health, because the practice increases the amount of airborne
chemicals.64 In addition, regarding the Oxygenated Fuel
Program, corn ethanol may not have been the contributing
factor in declining CO.65 Finally, regarding the RFG Program,
while commentators concede that RFG is one of the factors for
the long-term downward trend in smog, commentators are
uncertain of how much RFG contributed to that trend.66 Also,
because the EPA measures gasoline volatility differently
between blended motor fuel and RFG, it is possible that
increased use of ethanol could result in higher emissions of
volatile organic compounds (VOCs).67 This increase in
emissions could ultimately result in higher emissions of
ground-level ozone.68
Corn ethanol production potentially raises several
environmental concerns related to land use. Increased corn
60. See Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1082, 1110 (listing
that “Ethanol from Sugarcane” has a lower carbon intensity value than
“Ethanol from Corn”).
61. Powers, supra note 13, at 687.
62. Id. at 684–88.
63. See supra notes 41–46 and accompanying text (explaining the
Oxygenated Fuels Program and the RFG Program).
64. Powers, supra note 13, at 684.
65. Commentators point to other factors that could be the root of decline,
such as the changes in the automobile industry. Duffield et al., supra note 29,
at 447–48 (summarizing the findings and detailing two pieces of research
scholarship).
66. Id. at 449.
67. Id.
68. See id. at 448 (“Ozone is not usually emitted directly into the air, but
at ground level by a chemical reaction between oxides of nitrogen . . . and
volatile organic compounds . . . in the presence of sunlight.”).
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ethanol production could raise geographically related land use
issues, because the production is concentrated in the
Midwest.69 These land use issues are related to higher soil
erosion and soil nutrient loss.70 Additionally, some scholars
underscore concerns related to biodiversity that result from
continued corn production, such as the reduction of biome71 and
displacement of land that would otherwise qualify for
conservation.72 Finally, land use incurred during corn ethanol
production raises environmental issues related to water supply
in several ways. Not only is corn ethanol production waterintensive,73 but production results in potentially hazardous
water runoffs. Since corn production requires fertilizers,
herbicides, and pesticides; and ethanol plants emit VOCs; the
net result from these chemicals is the production of runoffs that
pollute water bodies in the Midwest and create eutrophication
in and around the Gulf of Mexico.74
2. Cellulosic Ethanol
Even if INEOS Bio won the race for producing cellulosic
ethanol on a commercial scale, the race has more participants
not far behind. The companies POET and Abengoa, located in
Iowa and Kansas respectively, claim they are close to producing
cellulosic ethanol.75 POET intends to use biomass made out of
corncobs and Abengoa, biomass of agricultural waste, wood
waste, and nonfood crops.76
Commentators and researchers predict that the U.S.
cellulosic ethanol industry will have other features. Some
commentators posit that corn stover—the in-field residue after
69. See supra text accompanying note 27; cf. Duffield et al., supra note 29,
at 452 (“[T]he production of [cellulosic] feedstocks would not be concentrated
in one region of the United States, as is the case with corn.”); Mann & Hymel,
supra note 6, at 76 (“The most significant environmental effects of ethanol
production result from increased acreage in corn.”).
70. Geyer et al., supra note 3, at 75 (“[T]he removal of biomass for energy
production intensifies soil erosion, water runoff, and soil nutrient loss.”).
71. E.g., Powers, supra note 13, at 684.
72. Id. at 684–85.
73. Id. at 683–84 (“Corn is an extremely input-intensive crop, which
requires massive amounts of water.”); see Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 76–
77 (“A biorefinery that produces [100,000,000] gallons of ethanol per year
would use as much water as a town of about [500,000] people.”).
74. Geyer et al., supra note 3, at 75–76; Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at
76; Powers, supra note 13, at 683–84.
75. Wald, Fuel from Waste, supra note 20.
76. Id.
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corn harvest77—will become the main biomass for cellulosic
ethanol, because Midwestern corn-ethanol plants could
economically adapt their current production into employing
corn stover.78 Other commentators cite switchgrass as a
suitable cellulosic biomass option.79 Finally, researchers from
the influential Argonne National Laboratory (ANL)80 list other
biomass, such as willow and poplar, as potential candidates for
cellulosic ethanol.81
a. Federal Tax Benefits and Related Policies
Federal policies favoring cellulosic ethanol had their origin
in the Biomass Research and Development Act of 2000 (BRDA),
which funded competitive research programs with the purpose
of encouraging breakthroughs in various sources of renewable
energy.82 Yet, it was not until the Energy Policy Act of 2005
that Congress directly addressed cellulosic ethanol.
The Energy Policy Act of 2005 addressed cellulosic ethanol
in three ways: the Cellulosic Biomass Program, amendments to
the BRDA, and a reverse auction program.83 Under the

77. ZHICHAO WANG ET AL., ARGONNE NAT’L LAB., MATERIAL AND ENERGY
FLOWS IN THE PRODUCTION OF CELLULOSIC FEEDSTOCKS FOR BIOFUELS FOR
THE GREET MODEL 3 (2013), available at http://greet.es.anl.gov/files/
feedstocks-13.
78. Id.
79. Geyer et al., supra note 3, at 73; cf. WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at 21
(“Currently there are public and private [switchgrass] breeding programs
throughout the United States.”).
80. See Brief for Professors of Environmental Law as Amici Curiae
Supporting Appellants at 21, Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Goldstene,
730 F.3d. 1070 (9th Cir. 2013) (Nos. 12-15131, 12-15135) (explaining that the
lifecycle analysis model maintained by the Argonne National Laboratory
influences regulatory agencies in five U.S. states).
81. See WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at i (listing the varieties of biomass
discussed in the report).
82. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 436.
83. The amendments to BRDA refined the BRDA’s goals and redirected
research emphasis. Id. The amendments aimed at facilitating the production
of cellulosic ethanol. Arnold W. Reitze, Jr., Biofuels—Snake Oil for the
Twenty-First Century, 87 OR. L. REV. 1183, 1244 (2008). Since then, the Farm
Bill of 2014 further amended the BRDA to continue to award research and
development programs. H.R. Res. 2642, 113th Cong. (2014) (enacted);
RES.
&
DEV.,
Advancing
Bioenergy
Technologies,
BIOMASS
http://www.biomassboard.gov/ (last updated Dec. 27, 2012); SI Staff, President
Obama Signs Farm Bill into Law, SOLAR INDUSTRY (Feb. 10, 2014),
http://www.solarindustrymag.com/e107_plugins/content/content.php?content.1
3788.
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Cellulosic Biomass Program, Congress introduced RFS
requirements84 for cellulosic ethanol and introduced other
programs.85
After the RFS for cellulosic ethanol was introduced, the
RFS was amended by the EISA.86 Under the current RFS,
cellulosic ethanol falls under the definition of “cellulosic
biofuels,” what the RFS defined as a kind of “advanced
biofuel.”87 The RFS sets targets that are subject to the EPA’s
adjustments.88 For example, by 2012, half a billion gallons of
ethanol sold in the United States must be cellulosic biofuel, and
by 2022, the cellulosic biofuel must be more than three
quarters of the amount of advanced biofuel.89 Yet, in its
implementation, the cellulosic biofuel part of the RFS has been
more complex. In 2011, the EPA projected that cellulosic
biofuel production could reach 6.6 million gallons, when the
figure was really zero.90 Under the RFS Program, the EPA
projections are key because, if the projections are lower than
the RFS mandated amount, the EPA Administrator may lower
the mandated amount accordingly.91
Other than the RFS, the programs nested in the Cellulosic
Biomass Program included programs for (1) cellulosic ethanol
production loans; (2) research on cellulosic ethanol production;
Last, under the Energy Policy Act of 2005, the reverse auction program
allows the Secretary of Energy to buy the first billion gallons of cellulosic
ethanol. 42 U.S.C. § 16251(c) (2006); Geyer et al., supra note 3, at 65. An
observer suggested that the reverse auction program could lower the
transaction costs of cellulosic ethanol. Geyer et al., supra note 3, at 65
(“[R]everse actions . . . can lower the cost of procuring products and services.”
(internal quotations omitted)).
84. See supra notes 47–55 and accompanying text for discussion on the
role of the RFS in spurring corn ethanol production.
85. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 435.
86. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 706 F.3d 474, 475 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
87. Id. at 476. “Advanced biofuels” achieve a lifecycle GHG emission
displacement of fifty percent compared to gasoline. Powers, supra note 13, at
699–700; Am. Petroleum Inst., 706 F.3d at 480–81.
88. Am. Petroleum Inst., 706 F.3d at 475.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 477.
91. Id. at 476. Indeed, in 2013, the EPA projections and the
Administrator’s mandated determinations were subject to litigation in
American Petroleum Institute v. EPA. The American Petroleum Institute (API)
is a fossil fuel energy trade association. About API, AM. PETROLEUM INST.,
http://www.api.org/globalitems/globalheaderpages/about-api (last visited Mar.
2, 2014). The API petitioned the D.C. Circuit to review the EPA’s 2012 RFS
rule and the EPA’s refusal to lower the 2012 mandates. Am. Petroleum Inst.,
706 F.3d at 476. The D.C. Circuit vacated the 2012 RFS rule. Id. at 481.
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and (3) the Department of Energy to create an Advanced
Biofuels Technologies Program.92
Unlike other cellulosic ethanol federal policies, the tax
incentives directed at cellulosic ethanol were introduced in
2006. Two of the tax incentives are still in effect. The Tax
Relief and Health Act of 2006 provided that cellulosic biomass
ethanol plants in service before January 1, 2013 may receive a
fifty percent bonus depreciation.93 Since then, the American
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 extended the bonus depreciation to
January 1, 2014 and broadened “cellulosic biomass ethanol” to
apply to any “cellulosic biofuel.”94 The Senate Finance
Committee Majority cited reasons for the 2012 change, three of
which relate to cellulosic ethanol: fostering technological
development, encouraging energy independence, and creating
manufacturing jobs in the United States.95
The Farm Bill of 2008 provided the second tax incentive—a
credit to motor fuel producers that blend ethanol in motor
fuel.96 The credit includes cellulosic ethanol, which may receive
$1.01 per gallon credit.97 Like the bonus depreciation, the
American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012 extended the credit to
December 31, 2013 and broadened “cellulosic biofuel” to apply
to “second generation biofuel.”98 The Senate Finance
Committee Majority cited two reasons related to cellulosic
ethanol for the 2012 change—(1) spurring further commercial
biofuel development; and (2) ensuring energy independence
through fostering a diversity of fuel sources.99

92. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 435.
93. I.R.C. § 168(l)(1) (2012); Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 52 n.69. A
“bonus depreciation” is a kind of tax benefit that enables a taxpayer to
depreciate a property the first year the property enters into operation. A Brief
Overview
of Depreciation,
IRS, http://www.irs.gov/Businesses/SmallBusinesses-&-Self-Employed/A-Brief-Overview-of-Depreciation (last updated
Sept. 16, 2013).
94. American Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-240, § 410, 126
Stat. 2313, 2342–43 (2013).
95. S. REP. NO. 112-208, at 96 (2012). But see id. at 112 (“[The Committee
Minority is] concerned that the relentless dedication to subsidizing so-called
‘green energy’ will prevent the most efficient development of energy sources
and cause a loss of jobs in the broader economy.”).
96. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 49.
97. Food, Conservation, and Energy Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-234,
§ 15321, 122 Stat. 923, 1512.
98. § 404, 126 Stat. at 2338–39.
99. S. REP. NO. 112-208, at 85 (2012). But see supra note 95 for the quote
from the Committee Minority.
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b. Environmental Effects
Since cellulosic ethanol has only recently become
commercially viable, the studies addressing environmental
effects of cellulosic ethanol are inchoate, if not speculative.100
The available results based on cellulosic ethanol produced in
the experimental stage101 address areas such as GHG
emissions, impact on biodiversity, and the land use
implications.
There are mixed views on the issue of GHG emissions
resulting from the production of cellulosic ethanol. An INEOS
Bio chief executive argued that the company’s ethanol
production process is “carbon-negative.” This executive
reasoned that the electricity produced from the INEOS Bio
plant precludes GHG emissions that would have come from
more GHG-intensive sources.102 Yet, according to a 2013 ANL
report, production of cellulosic ethanol is not completely free
from GHG emissions. On the one hand, the report listed the
relative environmental advantages of native North American
plants such as switchgrass.103 On the other hand, the report
pointed to the way that production of ethanol from certain
cellulosic biomass could emit more GHGs. Biomass such as
corn stover may require increased use of fertilizers.104 To
achieve optimal yield, even switchgrass requires use of
fertilizers.105 Finally, the report communicated the GHGemission concerns of growing nonnative plants, since growing
these plants in greenhouses is energy intensive.106
Regarding the environmental impact of cellulosic ethanol
on biodiversity, observers’ views depend on the kind of biomass
100. See WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at 54–55 (listing outstanding issues
in production and conversion technologies for cellulosic biomass feedstocks).
101. See, e.g., Calfucoy, supra note 11, at 565 (noting the cellulosic ethanol
from Sweden and Switzerland).
102. Wald, Fuel from Waste, supra note 20. But cf. Am. Petroleum Inst. v.
EPA, 706 F.3d 474, 478 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (citing the petitioner arguing that
cellulosic biofuel facility owners tend toward overstatement).
103. WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at 21.
104. Id. at 10–11. For ANL’s lifecycle analysis, fertilizer use is an
important factor. Id. at 10; cf. Robert Sanders, Fertilizer Use Responsible for
Increase in Nitrous Oxide in Atmosphere, UC BERKELEY NEWS CENTER (Apr.
2, 2012), http://newscenter.berkeley.edu/2012/04/02/fertilizer-use-responsiblefor-increase-in-nitrous-oxide-in-atmosphere/ (“[I]ncreased fertilizer use . . . is
responsible for a dramatic rise in atmospheric nitrous oxide, which is a major
[GHG] contributing to global climate change.”).
105. WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at 23.
106. Id. at 14.
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producers use, and where their production takes place. By
supposing that cellulosic ethanol is produced from woody fibers,
some observers speculate that the impact of cellulosic ethanol
production on the ecosystem is negligible.107 Yet, by supposing
that the cellulosic ethanol is produced from switchgrass,
observers speculate that this grass could become invasive, or
lead to displacement of species from their habitat.108 Moreover,
because the EPA allows cellulosic biomass to grow in
Conservation Reserve Program land,109 this EPA practice could
threaten biodiversity among plant species, a threat that would
be more serious if the plants were genetically modified.110
The land use effects of growing cellulosic biomass,
especially compared to growing corn, seem more positive.
Unlike corn ethanol production’s concentration in the Midwest,
cellulosic ethanol production may be more dispersed.111 Also,
growing cellulosic biomass, such as switchgrass, requires less
fertilizers, pesticides, and herbicides.112 Further, a scholar
found that cellulosic biomass, when compared to corn, is more
beneficial to soil fertility and more conducive to reducing
erosion.113 Finally, the 2013 ANL report noted the
characteristics of certain plants that could result in positive
land use effects. For example, miscanthus x giganteus is
efficient in terms of water use,114 and short-rotation woody
crops, such as willow and poplar, grow quickly.115
Despite these potential environmental benefits, even the
INEOS Bio Chief Operating Officer admits that his Florida
plant has yet to achieve optimal yield: “Now we want to
produce more ethanol from a ton of wood, rather than just
making ethanol from a ton of wood.”116
107. See Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 498 (“[The sources for
cellulosic ethanol] require less energy, fertilizer, [and] water . . . .”).
108. Barbera, supra note 12, at 40–41.
109. “Conservation Reserve Program” is a scheme where the Department
of Agriculture pays farmers to set aside and restore or protect
environmentally sensitive lands. Powers, supra note 13, at 701.
110. Id.
111. Duffield et al., supra note 29, at 452.
112. Barbera, supra note 12, at 38; cf. WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at 21
(“[Switchgrass] has consistently high yields with minimal inputs and is wellsuited to marginal land.”).
113. Barbera, supra note 12, at 39 & n.92.
114. WANG ET AL., supra note 77, at 13.
115. Id. at 28.
116. Matthew L. Wald, Milestone Claimed in Creating Fuel from Waste,
N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/01/business/
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B. BRAZIL
While Brazil has experimented with biofuels such as palm
oil,117 sugarcane ethanol is still Brazil’s dominant biofuel.118 In
2009, Brazil produced about 6.9 billion gallons of sugarcane
ethanol,119 most of it in the Southeast.120 Brazil’s sugarcane is
likewise grown mostly in the Southeast.121 Still, Brazil’s
ethanol use is more widespread. About 16% of the nation’s
vehicles may run on ethanol (these vehicles are called flex-fuel
vehicles (FFVs)).122 In 2009, about 90% of new vehicles in
Brazil were FFVs.123
1. Federal Tax Benefits and Related Policies
In the 1970s, Brazil—then ruled under a military
dictatorship124—first enacted tax benefits aimed at encouraging
energy independence.125 The 1970s oil crises had a sobering
effect on Brazil because it imported eighty percent of its oil.126
Indeed, from the 1970s to the mid-1980s dictatorship era,
the government developed and sustained a host of policies
favoring sugarcane ethanol. These policies became more
aggressive over time. At first, the policies—such as blending
mandates127 were aimed at developing ethanol to supplement
gasoline,128 but, starting in 1979, the government turned its
energy-environment/company-says-its-the-first-to-make-ethanol-fromwaste.html?_r=0 [hereinafter Wald, Milestone Claimed].
117. Sandra Dos Santos, Comment, The Tainted Grail of Brazilian
Ethanol: Achieving Oil Independence but Who Has Borne the Cost and Paid
the Price?, 11 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 61, 87 (2007).
118. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 496.
119. VALDES, supra note 14, at 10 (26.1 billion liters); Liters to US Gallons
(Liquid), METRIC CONVERSIONS, http://www.metric-conversions.org/volume/
liters-to-us-liquid-gallons.htm (last updated Feb. 8, 2013).
120. VALDES, supra note 14, at 10.
121. Id. at 5.
122. Ethanol Fuel in Brazil, UN-ENERGY KNOWLEDGE NETWORK (Jan. 8,
2011), http://www.un-energy.org/stories/38-ethanol-fuel-in-brazil.
123. Roberto Samora, Gabrielli: Etanol Reduzirá Mercado de Gasolina a
17% até 2020, G1 (June 2, 2009), http://g1.globo.com/Noticias/Mundo/
0,,MUL1180455-5602,00-GABRIELLI+ETANOL+REDUZIRA+MERCADO+
DE+GASOLINA+A+ATE.html.
124. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 482 & n.29.
125. EDNALDO MICHELLON ET AL., BREVE DESCRIÇÃO DO PROÁLCOOL E
PERSPECTIVAS FUTURAS PARA O ETANOL PRODUZIDO NO BRASIL 11 (2008),
available at http://www.sober.org.br/palestra/9/574.pdf.
126. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 482.
127. Id. at 481.
128. Id. at 482.
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attention to pure ethanol129 through production mandates for
the ethanol industry, agreements with FFV manufacturers,
and tax benefits to FFV buyers.130 Through all those years, the
government implemented several financial measures, which
included loans and subsidies to energy producers, investment
in genetically modified sugarcane, and setting up ethanol.131
After the military dictatorship regime ended in Brazil, for
less than a decade, Brazil’s ethanol market stagnated;132 yet,
starting in the 1990s, Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol industry
thrived anew. In 1985, Brazil’s military dictatorship ended and
the nation started to transition to democracy.133 The previous
ethanol policy incentives were no longer viable in a nation that
faced inflation and trade imbalance, and thus most of the
policies were dismantled.134 But starting in the early 1990s,
Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol industry began to convalesce.
Two major factors contributed to the industry’s recovery—
market forces and environmental awareness. In the area of
market forces, the sugarcane ethanol industry modernized
itself to remain competitive,135 oil prices spiked due to
instability in some regions in the Middle East,136 and, in 2003,
commercially viable FFVs were introduced in the automobile
market.137 In the area of environmental awareness, in 1993,
Brazil enacted E22 mandates to reduce air pollutant
emissions,138 and, in 1997, the Kyoto Protocol created greater
awareness of the need to enlist renewable fuels as to reduce
GHG emissions.139
Currently, Brazil has in place three major federal policies
that regulate its sugarcane industry: mandated blending rates,
129. Id. at 484.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 483, 485.
132. Id. at 486.
133. Id. at 485.
134. Id.
135. Id. at 486–87. “Agriculture was mechanized, scientists experimented
with new variations of sugar cane, strategic mergers and acquisitions were
carried out, and mills and distilleries were modernized. Many private
institutions arose as well.” Id. at 487.
136. Id. at 487.
137. Id. at 487–88. “The Brazilian flex-fuel engine runs on any combination
of anhydrous ethanol and gasoline blend, as well as [pure ethanol]. By
contrast, [FFVs] produced in other countries operate on a blend of a maximum
of [E85].” Id. at 488.
138. Id. at 486.
139. Id. at 487.
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credits for the ethanol industry, and various tax benefits.140
Historically, Brazil has had mandates for ethanol blends in
motor fuel.141 The government adjusts the mandate according
to market conditions.142 In April 2013, the Brazilian federal
government announced that to spur ethanol investment and
supply, it would increase the mandate from E20 to E25.143
Like the mandated blending rates, financial assistance to
the ethanol industry in Brazil is not historically unseen.144 In
fact, credit programs have proliferated since the mid-2000s.145
In 2010, the Central Bank of Brazil established a credit line of
about $1.37 billion to assist ethanol plants, distilleries,
production cooperatives, trading companies, etc.146
Formally, Brazil has three federal tax benefits in place.
First, the Contribuição de Intervenção no Domínio Econômico
(CIDE, translated as “intervening contribution on the economic
domain”) is collected to fund various transportation fuels and
resources. The CIDE mainly funds: (1) ethanol, natural gas,
and petroleum; (2) transportation facility programs; and (3)
environmental projects addressing petroleum and gasoline
issues.147 The CIDE itself affects both the gasoline and the
ethanol industries, because gasoline import tariffs are about
twenty-three times higher than ethanol.148
Second, the Programas de Integração Social e de Formação
do Patrimônio do Servidor Público (PIS/PASEP, translated as
“programs of social integration and of establishment of public
140. See id. at 488–89.
141. See id. at 484 (discussing the initial policy of mandatory minimum
blends).
142. VALDES, supra note 14, at 24.
143. Fábio Amato, Governo Corta Tributos e Aumenta Percentual de Álcool
na Gasolina, G1 ECONOMIA (Apr. 23, 2013, 12:26 PM), http://g1.globo.com/
economia/noticia/2013/04/governo-anuncia-medidas-para-o-setorsucroalcooleiro.html.
144. See supra note 131 and accompanying text.
145. VALDES, supra note 14, at 24 (“Financing for the ethanol sector has
risen since the mid-2000s, with the amount of credit granted increasing
rapidly and new credit programs being implemented.”).
146. Ricardo Silva et al., International Energy and Natural Resources Law,
45 INT’L LAW. 297, 298 (2011).
147. Contribuição de Intervenção no Domínio Econômico (Cide), CÂMARA
DOS DEPUTADOS (May 22, 2006, 10:20 AM), http://www2.camara.gov.br/
camaranoticias/noticias/88696.html.
148. See Lei No. 10.336, de 19 de Dezembro de 2001, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 20.12.2001 (Braz.) (listing under article 5 that the gasoline
tariff shall be R$860,00 per m3 (860,00 Brazilian Real per cubic meter), while
ethanol is R$37,20 per m3).
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servant endowment”) is collected to be spent on pensions for
business and government employees.149 Until December 23,
2013, the PIS/PASEP had a blender’s credit component for a
producer, which is about $0.005 per gallon.150 Another relevant
component of the PIS/PASEP is that, while a gasoline producer
must pay 5.08% of its aggregate revenue,151 an ethanol
producer only pays 1.5% of its aggregate revenue.152
Finally, the Contribuição para o Financiamento da
Seguridade Social (COFINS, translated as “contribution for the
funding of social security”) is a tax collected for social security
purposes.153 Until December 23, 2013, the COFINS credit for
blenders was about $0.024 per gallon.154 For a gasoline
producer, COFINS requires 23.44% of the producer’s aggregate
revenue,155 while for an ethanol producer the figure is 6.9%.156

149. PIS-Programa de Integração Social, CAIXA, http://www.caixa.gov.br/
voce/social/beneficios/pis/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2014).
150. Decreto No. 6.573, de 19 de Setembro de 2008, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA
UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 22.9.2008 (Braz.) (listing under the stricken article 3(I) the
amount of R$3,21 per m3); Cubic Meters to Gallons, METRIC CONVERSIONS,
http://www.metric-conversions.org/volume/cubic-meters-to-gallons.htm
(last
updated Feb. 8, 2013); Convert United States Dollar to Brazilian Real,
http://themoneyconverter.com/USD/BRL.aspx
THEMONEYCONVERTER.COM,
(last visited Feb. 28, 2014) (reset “From USD to BRL” to “From BRL to USD”
in the middle box).
A motor fuel trade association executive explained that the government
decided that the blender’s credit would not have an effect after May 2013.
Decreto Zera Crédito de PIS/Cofins na Aquisição de Álcool à Gasolina,
AGRICULTURA
(Dec.
24,
2013,
12:50
PM),
http://
RURALBR
agricultura.ruralbr.com.br/noticia/2013/12/decreto-zera-credito-de-pis-cofinsna-aquisicao-de-alcool-a-gasolina-4373642.html [hereinafter Decreto Zera].
151. Lei No. 9.718, de 27 de Novembro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 28.11.1998 (Braz.) (listing under article 4(I) that the amount is
5.08%).
152. Id. (listing under article 5(I) that the amount is 1.5%).
153. Under Brazil’s Federal Constitution, “social security” includes health
BRAZIL,
http://
and
social
welfare.
COFINS,
MASTERCLASS
masterclassbrazil.com/managing-a-business-in-brazil/taxes/cofins/ (last visited
Feb. 28, 2014).
154. See supra note 150 (citing to the decree article that lists the stricken
COFINS credit as R$14,79 and relevant Internet sources to convert the listed
figures). Similar to the PIS/PASEP blender’s credit, the COFINS blender’s
credit had not been in effect since May 2013. Decreto Zera, supra note 150.
155. Lei No. 9.718, de 27 de Novembro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 28.11.1998 (Braz.) (listing under article 4(I) that the amount is
23.44%).
156. Id. (listing under article 5(I) that amount is 6.9%).
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2. Environmental Effects
The environmental effects of the sugarcane ethanol
industry touch on at least four areas—GHG emissions, air
pollutant emissions, land use, and biodiversity.157
When compared to corn ethanol and gasoline, sugarcane
ethanol emits the lowest amount of GHGs. Unlike corn ethanol
plants, which are usually powered by nonrenewable sources,
such as coal or natural gas, Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol plants
are mainly powered by renewable sources, such as
hydroelectricity.158 Both the U.S. federal and state policies
recognize sugarcane ethanol as raising fewer GHG-emission
concerns than corn ethanol. According to EISA, sugarcane
ethanol—not corn ethanol—is defined as an “advanced
biofuel.”159 EISA recognizes that sugarcane ethanol achieves a
lifecycle GHG-emission displacement half that of gasoline.160
California—the state “in the vanguard of efforts to protect the
environment”161—determined that the average Brazilian
sugarcane ethanol production process emitted a lesser amount
of GHGs than the U.S. corn ethanol process.162
Yet, observers note that sugarcane ethanol production in
Brazil is imperfect. Brazil is still in the process of abating a
decades-old practice of clearing land by fire.163 In Brazil,
farmers burn sugarcane fields twice a year before manual
harvesting,164 but the burning would be unnecessary if the
farmers mechanized the harvesting process.165 Unsurprisingly,
the manual harvesting practice emits large amounts of carbon
dioxide,166 the main GHG linked to climate change.167 While
the Brazilian federal and state governments have taken
measures to increase mechanization, the mandated

157. Yet, the sugarcane ethanol industry is criticized for human rights
violations. E.g., Dos Santos, supra note 117, at 88–91.
158. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1096 (9th
Cir. 2013).
159. Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-140,
§ 201, 121 Stat. 1492, 1519.
160. Id.
161. Rocky Mountain Farmers Union, 730 F.3d at 1078.
162. Id. at 1110.
163. VALDES, supra note 14, at 28–29.
164. Dos Santos, supra note 117, at 82.
165. VALDES, supra note 14, at 28.
166. Id.
167. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504–05 (2007).
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mechanization adoption rate by 2014 is 40%, and only by 2017
will the rate become 100%.168
The effect of sugarcane ethanol on air quality has been
mixed. On the one hand, ethanol use contributed to lower air
pollutant emissions in many Brazilian cities.169 On the other
hand, some commentators argue that ethanol production
increased air pollutant emissions in rural areas. Not only does
the burning of sugarcane raise GHG emission issues, but
studies showed a relationship between the aerosol particles
from burning sugarcane and respiratory ailments among rural
residents.170 These ailments have a higher impact on younger
and elderly residents.171
The environmental threats to biodiversity in Brazil relate
to Brazil’s Amazon and Cerrado regions. Some commentators
downplay the concern that the Amazon could be cleared for
sugarcane fields because the land’s climate is not favorable to
sugarcane cultivation,172 and the Brazilian Forest Code (BFC)
requires eighty percent of the region to be unaltered.173 Still,
the literature posits that the risks of deforestation in the region
are not unfounded. First, even if sugarcane production in the
region were unlikely to occur, industries and population
displaced by the sugarcane ethanol industry could migrate to
the Amazon.174 Second, enforcement of the BFC is likely to be
imperfect.175
Indeed, in the Cerrado region, many of the concerns
associated with the Amazon have already occurred. The
Cerrado is located in the Center-West176 and contains a wooded
savanna with an endangered ecosystem.177 From the 1960s to
the early 1990s, the Brazilian government fostered several
agricultural development programs in the Cerrado, which

168. VALDES, supra note 14, at 28–29.
169. Dos Santos, supra note 117, at 80.
170. Id. at 83.
171. Id. at 83–85.
172. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 493.
173. Calfucoy, supra note 11, at 589.
174. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 493.
175. Id. at 494 (“[E]nforcement of [the BFC] presents significant
challenges . . . where the vastness of the [Amazon] and the difficulties of
assessing remote areas pose significant obstacles . . . .”).
176. Id.
177. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 55 n.84 (“[The Cerrado] host[s] an
estimated 160,000 species of animals and plants, many threatened with
extinction.”).
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benefitted soybean and oilseed production and, in turn, freed
land for sugarcane ethanol production in the Southeast and
South.178 Under the BFC, thirty-five percent of the Cerrado is
reserved.179 Yet, like the enforcement of the BFC in the
Amazon, the enforcement of the BFC in the Cerrado may be
imperfect.180
In addition to endangerment of biome by indirect
expansion into the Amazon and the Cerrado, growing
sugarcane raises land use concerns of soil erosion and water
depletion. While some commentators conclude that the effect of
soil erosion in sugarcane fields is widespread, others claim
there are “conflicting reports” as to the actual risk of soil
erosion.181 Regarding water depletion, the main concern of
environmental advocates is that sugarcane ethanol plants
produce wastewater that could threaten rural communities and
Brazil’s interior.182
These environmental findings suggest that many of
Brazil’s legal and environmental characteristics are unique to
the sugarcane ethanol industry, but a question remains
whether these characteristics can be assimilated elsewhere.
II. THE BRAZILIANIZATION OF CELLULOSIC ETHANOL:
THE ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFITS OF EMULATING THE
BRAZILIAN ETHANOL TAX BENEFITS
A. THE LESSONS FROM BRAZIL
An extensive literature has examined Brazil’s sugarcane
ethanol policies with the purpose of improving the United
States’ ethanol policies; however, while some authors come
away with prescriptive recommendations, others conclude that
there is little the United States can learn.183
1. Lessons of Hope
The recommendations in most articles focus on policies
affecting the corn ethanol industry, either directly or indirectly.
The recurring recommendations argue for increased
178. VALDES, supra note 14, at 22.
179. Calfucoy, supra note 11, at 589.
180. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 494.
181. Dos Santos, supra note 117, at 85.
182. Id.
183. But see Powers, supra note 13, at 707 (suggesting that the U.S.
biofuels policy could “serve as a model for biofuels laws in other countries”).
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government financial support and for general policies favoring
biofuels.184 Other recommendations support spurring the
overall corn ethanol market.185 One commentator suggests that
any one policy recommendation does not necessarily preclude
others; she advises that many policies be implemented in
concert.186
Several
commentators
underscore
the
Brazilian
government’s investment-heavy policies, primarily when the
sugarcane ethanol industry was nascent, to infer that the U.S.
government should also offer munificent aid to corn ethanol
producers and distributors.187 For the producers, government
financial support could take the form of direct loans to
companies188 or support through securing ethanol prices.189 For
distributors, support could help develop ethanol supply
infrastructure.190 One such kind of infrastructure is to
encourage gas station operators to build E85 pumps191 because
all Brazilian gas stations must offer, at minimum, E85.192
Some commentators find that Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol
success story does not necessarily translate in the United
States into identical policies for corn ethanol. Rather, the
lessons from Brazil showed that the U.S. government should
spur biofuels generally.193 These commentators suggest that
other biofuels, such as biodiesel,194 could be conscripted to
supplement corn ethanol.195 A related approach is to enact
legislation to encourage more efficient biofuel production.196
The adherents of this approach suggest that efficient biofuel

184. See infra text accompanying notes 187–92.
185. See infra text accompanying notes 193–97.
186. Potter, supra note 6, at 350.
187. E.g., Barbera, supra note 12, at 47.
188. Id. at 45, 47 & n.156.
189. Id. at 45–46, 47 & n.156.
190. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 55.
191. Potter, supra note 6, at 346.
192. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 55 (“[A]ll Brazilian gas stations are
required to offer at least E85 ethanol [sic].”).
193. See id. (“Brazil’s experience offers some insight on how the United
States might produce biofuels more efficiently and support biofuel use more
effectively.”).
194. Potter, supra note 6, at 348 & n.129.
195. Cf. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 78 (“[T]he attention on ethanol
may distract researchers from developing new energy possibilities.”).
196. Id. at 55.
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production could be measured in terms of energy production
per unit of fossil fuel input or ethanol production per acre.197
Finally, a third kind of policy outlook addresses ethanol
market forces other than ethanol production or distribution.
One commentator prescribes that the government mandate
automobile manufacturers to increase the efficiency of
automobiles that are partly fueled by ethanol.198 Another
commentator argues that effective ethanol policies require
collaboration between the government and private industries in
advancing common energy goals.199 Other commentators, in
light of Brazil’s high gasoline taxes,200 suggest that the United
States also increase its taxes on ethanol’s competitor—
gasoline.201
2. Lessons of Despair202
Scholars who examined Brazil’s federal ethanol policies
and concluded that the United States would be unable to
replicate Brazil’s success rest this conclusion on three grounds.
First, the United States cannot overcome the various
advantages of producing ethanol with sugarcane over those
with corn.203 Second, the United States cannot replicate the
Brazilian political regime when the major sugarcane ethanol
policies were implemented.204 Third, reforming the U.S. ethanol
distribution system poses an insurmountable barrier.205
Scholars observe that, in comparison to the United States,
Brazil possesses several comparative advantages for producing
ethanol. In making this observation, scholars presume that the
197. Id. at 53.
198. Potter, supra note 6, at 350. Potter acknowledged that the federallymandated Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards are a step in
the right direction, but she supported even higher CAFE standards. Id. at 340
n.75, 350.
199. Barbera, supra note 12, at 46; cf. Calfucoy, supra note 11, at 589.
Calfucoy examined Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol experience to propose a
renewable motor fuel development model for developing countries. Id. at 563.
She argued that the primary reason for Brazil’s ethanol advances is due to
private and public sectors working together for environmental sustainability
goals. Id. at 593.
200. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 150–52.
201. Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 55.
202. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 496 (“[R]eproducing Brazil’s
ethanol success in the United States would be virtually impossible.”).
203. See infra text accompanying notes 206–08.
204. See infra text accompanying notes 209–12.
205. See infra text accompanying notes 213–14.
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United States will produce corn ethanol206 and not cellulosic
ethanol. The advantages listed by these scholars include
features related to growing sugarcane and producing sugarcane
ethanol. Because of Brazil’s favorable climate for sugarcane,
ample fertile land, and cheap labor supply, growing sugarcane
to fuel Brazil’s ethanol production is not taxing.207 In producing
ethanol, Brazil can accomplish its task at a lower cost by using
less energy and by placing less strain on farming.208
Scholars then argue that the United States could not
implement successful ethanol policies unless it was ruled under
a dictatorship. These scholars mean that the democratic
process frustrates centralized government action to spur
ethanol, such as fixing prices, and compelling gas stations to
carry ethanol.209 Since Brazil established a democratic
government, these scholars surmise that even Brazil would
currently be unsuccessful at incubating a new biofuel.210
Another commentator seems to tacitly concede this
argument.211 She argues that the United States’ governing
arrangement is unfavorable to incubating a new biofuel: “In a
constitutional republic, the decision-making process . . . is slow
and cumbersome.”212
Finally, scholars describe the U.S. ethanol distribution
case as a classic catch-22 scenario. This view takes the position
that widespread ethanol distribution through installation of
pure ethanol pumps is crucial to developing the ethanol
market.213 Yet, U.S. stations are less likely to offer pure
ethanol if fewer drivers own FFVs, and drivers are less likely to
purchase FFVs if few stations offer pure ethanol.214
3. The Whole Curriculum
On the specific issue of whether Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol
industry tax benefits should, for environmental reasons,
encourage the United States to enact similar tax benefits for

206. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 497–98.
207. Potter, supra note 6, at 347.
208. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 497.
209. Id. at 496–97.
210. Id. at 497.
211. See Potter, supra note 6, at 345–47 (highlighting a relationship
between political systems and effectiveness of ethanol policies).
212. Id. at 345.
213. Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 497.
214. Id.
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cellulosic ethanol, the academic literature provides some
helpful, but also less helpful insight.
The more helpful literature addresses the topic of cellulosic
ethanol tax benefits directly and indirectly. More directly, the
commentators favor the development of biofuels other than
corn ethanol,215 and cellulosic ethanol fits the bill. Granted, the
cellulosic ethanol industry is still inchoate,216 but cellulosic
ethanol does not need to necessarily supplant corn ethanol.
Cellulosic ethanol still could help supplement the ethanol
market. Furthermore, especially in terms of environmental
impact, cellulosic ethanol has the potential to be greener.217
More indirectly, commentators suggest that Brazilian
ethanol policies cannot be implemented wholesale in the
United States, because these commentators underscore major
differences between the United States and Brazil. For example,
a few commentators observe that the success of sugarcane
ethanol policies was due to the dictatorship regime that
initiated these policies.218 In contrast, democratic leadership
can only accomplish certain policies after more deliberation.219
Thus, these differences suggest that replicating Brazilian
ethanol policies does not necessary produce identical results.
The United States may lack some dispositive features—such as
a dictatorship—which make some Brazilian policies ineffective
when applied to the United States.
Another insight less directly related to cellulosic ethanol
tax benefits that can be gleaned from the scholarship is that
Congress has the option of formulating a variety of cellulosic
ethanol policies. Alternatives to tax benefits include incentives
to build E85 gas pumps220 and policies aimed at increasing the
efficiency of biofuel production.221
The less helpful literature recommends policies that tend
to underestimate the complexities of the U.S. ethanol market in
three ways. First, recommendations for higher investment in
the ethanol market seem to reinvent a wobbly wheel.
Historically, higher investment has not necessarily translated
215. See supra notes 193–95 and accompanying text.
216. See supra text accompanying note 100.
217. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 111–13 (listing that growing
cellulosic biomass can have land use benefits when compared to growing corn).
218. See text accompanying notes 209–12.
219. See text accompanying note 212.
220. See text accompanying notes 190–92.
221. See text accompanying notes 196–97.
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into intended results. Since 2000, the U.S. federal government
has funded research for biofuels.222 The recommendation also
fails to take into account that the costs to the government could
be wasted. Especially for corn ethanol incentives,223 studies
suggest that the United States has not been successful in
reaping the benefits in the areas of energy independence and
GHG emissions.224
Second, recommendations for establishing public-private
collaborations to spur ethanol are unlikely to materialize in
practice because the U.S. political system is likely to defeat the
establishment of such collaborations. Scholars already have
argued that there is government favoritism toward a few
agribusinesses.225 Even when the American Taxpayer Relief
Act of 2012 passed tax incentives for cellulosic ethanol, the
minority of the Senate Finance Committee Report censured the
majority for “extend[ing] too many [provisions] that have little
to do with sound tax policy and are actually harmful, marketdistorting subsidies.”226 Out of the majority’s nearly 100-page
report,227 the minority only singled out the “subsidizing of socalled ‘green energy’” as an example.228 As such, if a legislator
were indeed to submit a bill of public-private ethanol projects,
the other legislators could find the bill to be a sweetheart deal
and these legislators could vote against the bill. Indeed, even if
the fear of favoritism were unfounded, the mere perception that
the collaboration signals preferential treatment could be a kiss
of death for a bill.229
Third, the recommendations that advanced biofuels can
come to substitute for corn ethanol if only the government were
to take actions to bring them into fruition, are more
222. See supra text accompanying note 82 (noting the existence of the
Biomass Research and Development Act of 2000).
223. See supra text accompanying notes 35–40 (listing the tax incentives
for corn ethanol production).
224. See, e.g., Mann & Hymel, supra note 6, at 77 & n.245 (“Since first
enacted, U.S. tax incentives for ethanol production have . . . encouraged
increased ethanol fuel production. However, increasing production of cornbased ethanol will not be effective in achieving the broader goals of energy
security or reductions in GHG emissions.”); supra text accompanying notes
38–40 (listing the tax incentives for corn ethanol production).
225. See supra text accompanying note 57.
226. S. REP. NO. 112-208, at 112 (2012).
227. See id. at 1–3 (listing the contents section of the committee report).
228. Id. at 112.
229. Cf. supra note 212 and accompanying text (describing the U.S.
government decision making as “slow and cumbersome”).
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misconceived than visionary. Cellulosic ethanol policies
illustrate this misconceived understanding in two notable
ways. As early as 2006, Congress enacted tax benefits for
cellulosic ethanol.230 Yet the first commercial-scale cellulosic
ethanol production only came about seven years later.231
Indeed, Congress’s 2012 adjustment of the tax benefits
pertaining to cellulosic ethanol implies that Congress’s 2006
expectations of biofuels were misguided. The Senate Finance
Committee majority reported that these adjustments to the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) would foster technological
development.232 If these senators knew what kind of tax
provisions could successfully foster the development of various
biofuels, they would likely have enacted them years ago.
The course of the RFS for cellulosic ethanol is nearly
parallel to that of the tax benefits. Since 2005, Congress
created the RFS for cellulosic ethanol, which aspired that, by
2012, there would be half a billion gallons of commercial
cellulosic ethanol.233 In addition, Congress created in the RFS a
safety valve where the EPA could lower the congressional
mandates.234 Since cellulosic ethanol only became commercially
viable in 2013,235 the RFS shows that congressional mandates
were overoptimistic, and Congress was aware of its
overoptimism.236
B. DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE U.S. AND
BRAZILIAN ETHANOL TAX BENEFITS
Though scholars and commentators have produced
extensive literature on the broader issue of the relevance of
Brazil’s ethanol policies to U.S. ethanol policies, none of that
literature is limited to the scope of sugarcane and cellulosic
ethanol industries’ tax benefits. This Section compares and
contrasts the tax benefits in order to tease out the topic.

230. See supra text accompanying note 93.
231. See supra text accompanying note 100.
232. See supra text accompanying note 95.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 86–88.
234. See supra text accompanying note 91.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 1–2.
236. Cf. Am. Petroleum Inst. v. EPA, 706 F.3d 474, 476 (D.C. Cir. 2013)
(“Recognizing the technological challenges, Congress provided for the
possibility that actual production would fall short of the stated
requirements.”).

1144

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

[Vol. 15:2

1. How the U.S. Cellulosic Ethanol Tax Benefits Differ from
the Brazilian Sugarcane Tax Benefits
The U.S. and Brazilian ethanol tax benefits differ in their
(1) scope; (2) expiration date; (3) tax benefits’ relationship to
gasoline taxes; (4) the information the benefits offer about tax
revenue; and (5) the blender’s credit. Unlike the U.S. tax
benefits, which apply to biofuels other than cellulosic
ethanol,237 the Brazilian tax benefits provisions are limited to
ethanol.238
The U.S. and Brazilian ethanol tax benefits also differ in
that only the U.S. tax benefits have an end date. In the United
States, the bonus depreciation provisions expired on January 1,
2014, and the blender’s credit expired on December 31, 2013.239
Further, unlike the United States, the Brazilian tax codes
provide, facially, a discrete tax treatment for gasoline and
ethanol. And this discrete treatment is not de minimis. In
Brazil, the gasoline producers are taxed at least three times
more than the ethanol producers.240
Fourth, Brazilian ethanol tax benefits offer more
information than the U.S. ethanol tax benefits, especially about
the tax revenue expenditures. In the United States, the IRC
provisions that benefit cellulosic ethanol only give information
about the kind of taxpayer or source to which the provision
applies. For example, the cellulosic biofuel blender’s credit, now
the second-generation biofuel blender’s credit, only informs the
taxpayer who or what kind of source the code addresses.241 In
contrast, the Brazilian ethanol blender’s credit mentions the
kind of taxpayer—whether producer, importer, or distributor—
and the use of the collected revenue—whether for pensions,

237. See, e.g., supra note 98 (explaining that the American Taxpayer Relief
Act nested cellulosic ethanol under “second generation biofuel”).
238. In fact, the Brazilian revenue codes use the terms “álcool estílico
combustível” (ethyl alcohol fuel), Lei No. 10.636, de 30 de Dezembro de 2002,
DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO [D.O.U.] de 31.12.2002 (Braz.), and “álcool”
(alcohol), Lei No. 9.718, de 27 de Novembro de 1998, DIÁRIO OFICIAL DA UNIÃO
[D.O.U.] de 28.11.1998 (Braz.), but, in effect, the codes apply only to ethanol.
See Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 490 (stating that there are
“significant tax incentives for ethanol production in Brazil”).
239. See supra notes 94, 98 and accompanying text.
240. See supra text accompanying notes 153, 155–56 (explaining that the
COFINS for a gasoline producer is 22.44%, while for an ethanol producer it is
6.9%).
241. See supra text accompanying note 96.
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social security, etc.242 In the United States, while reports from
congressional committees may offer some insight into the main
aims for the tax legislation, these reports are silent as to how
the federal government will spend the tax revenue.243
Finally, though only the United States provides tax credits
for producers that blend ethanol with gasoline,244 the difference
between Brazil and the United States is a bit more complex.
Brazil only repealed its blender’s credit late in 2013.245
2. What the Tax Benefits Have in Common
The U.S. and Brazilian tax benefits have two features in
common: (1) potential benefits for each country’s own
workforce; and (2) the context of a larger umbrella of policies
favoring ethanol production. Both the United States and Brazil
enacted their respective tax benefits taking into consideration
their national workforces. In the United States, the Senate
Committee Majority explained that one of the reasons for the
majority’s changes to the ethanol plant bonus depreciation
provisions was to “creat[e] manufacturing jobs in the United
States.”246 In Brazil, the tax revenue collected under the
PIS/PASEP is spent on pensions of business and government
employees.247 The PIS/PASEP’s relationship to funding of
pensions is further complicated because, in effect, gasoline
producers subsidize the ethanol producers’ contributions to the
pensions. Compared to the gasoline producers, ethanol
producers have a lighter PIS/PASEP tax burden because a
PIS/PASEP of a gasoline producer is three times higher than
that of an ethanol producer.248
Additionally, in both countries, tax benefits are only a
carrot in a larger basket of policies affecting ethanol
production. For example, in addition to tax benefits, both the

242. See supra notes 149, 153, and accompanying text for information
about the uses of PIS/PASEP and COFINS, respectively.
243. E.g., S. REP. NO. 112-208, at 96 (2012) (“The Committee acknowledges
that encouraging manufacturing of biofuels in the United States is important
for fostering innovative new technology, encouraging energy independence,
and creating manufacturing jobs in the United States.”).
244. See supra text accompanying notes 96–98.
245. See supra text accompanying notes 150, 154.
246. S. REP. NO. 112-208, at 96.
247. See supra text accompanying note 149.
248. See supra text accompanying notes 150–52.
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United States and Brazil mandate that ethanol be blended
with gasoline.249
C. ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECTS
Tax benefits that spur ethanol production in the United
States and Brazil have the likelihood of impacting these
countries’ environment, and these environmental impacts can
be considered in the areas of GHG emissions, biodiversity, land
use, and possibly air pollutant emissions.
1. Greenhouse Gas Emissions
When sugarcane ethanol production is placed next to
cellulosic ethanol production, it is unclear which kind of
ethanol emits less GHGs because many questions about the
future of cellulosic ethanol production remain unanswered.
Sugarcane ethanol production is recognized as emitting a low
amount of GHGs,250 and the production is in the process of
emitting less.251 On the one hand, cellulosic ethanol industry
executives claim that cellulosic ethanol plants use few GHGintensive sources,252 and, assuming that cellulosic biomass
would be made up of native grasses, one could surmise that
growing native grasses will raise fewer GHG emission concerns
than sugarcane ethanol production.253
On the other hand, if cellulosic ethanol biomass were to
mainly be made up of corn stover and nonnative plants,254
cellulosic ethanol may not trump sugarcane ethanol. If
cellulosic ethanol plants were to primarily use corn stover,
cellulosic ethanol production’s emission of GHGs could be
significantly higher than the sugarcane ethanol production
emissions. First, corn stover may require increased use of

249. Compare supra text accompanying notes 86–89 (explaining the RFS
program in the United States), with supra text accompanying notes 141–43
(explaining the mandated blending rates in Brazil). Yet, despite these
mandates, the scheme of the U.S. and Brazilian mandates and the countries’
other ethanol production incentives are not identical. Further scholarship
could examine the effect of the differences on the countries’ ethanol industries.
250. See supra text accompanying notes 158–62.
251. See supra text accompanying notes 163–68 (summarizing the harms of
the harvest-burning practice and the Brazilian government initiatives to
address those harms).
252. See supra text accompanying note 102.
253. See supra text accompanying note 103.
254. See supra text accompanying notes 104, 106.
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fertilizers.255 In addition, corn stover could implicate some of
the same GHG emission concerns as corn ethanol,256 such as
global indirect land use changes.257 Finally, growing nonnative
plants is energy intensive.258
2. Biodiversity
The differences between the environmental effects of
cellulosic and sugarcane ethanol on biodiversity are
inconclusive for at least two reasons. The effects depend on the
kind of cellulosic biomass the ethanol plants will use, and the
real facts of sugarcane ethanol’s threat to Brazil’s Amazon and
Cerrado regions.
While current cellulosic biomass may not threaten plant
and animal species,259 prospective cellulosic biomass may not
be so forgiving. Not only could some cellulosic biomass cultivars
become evasive, but the current regulatory scheme allows
biomass to grow in Conservation Reserve Program land.260
To further complicate the matter, in the Brazilian regions
where biome protection is most needed—the Amazon and
Cerrado—the protection may be lacking. That lack of protection
could come about if people and industries displaced by
sugarcane ethanol production261 were to settle in the Amazon
and Cerrado and authorities were to fail to enforce the relevant
conservation codes.262
3. Land Use
While the scholarship addressing cellulosic ethanol
production’s effects on land use mainly considers that cellulosic
raises fewer land use issues than corn ethanol,263 these

255. See supra text accompanying note 104.
256. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 77–78 (explaining that Midwestern
corn ethanol industry actors could be spurred to adapt their plants to
producing corn stover cellulosic ethanol).
257. See supra text accompanying notes 61–62 (detailing the course of
events where (1) corn market fluctuations cause (2) decreases in the amount of
land that is highly effective in sequestering GHGs).
258. See supra text accompanying note 106.
259. INEOS Bio and Abengoa use waste as biomass; POET uses corn cobs.
Wald, Fuel from Waste, supra note 20.
260. See supra notes 108–10 and accompanying text.
261. See supra notes 174, 178.
262. See supra notes 175, 180 and accompanying text (discussing and
citing sources that suggest that the BFC may not be properly enforced).
263. See supra text accompanying notes 111–13.
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considerations may still help to compare cellulosic ethanol
production with sugarcane ethanol production.
First, cellulosic ethanol production could be less
geographically
concentrated
than
sugarcane
ethanol
production. In Brazil, sugarcane fields and sugarcane ethanol
plants are concentrated in the Southeast.264 Commentators
predicted in 2008 that cellulosic ethanol plants can be more
dispersed.265 The current locations of the larger U.S. cellulosic
ethanol plants support the prediction because these cellulosic
ethanol plants are found in several states spread out across the
continental United States.266
Still, other observers suggest that cellulosic ethanol
production could be as geographically concentrated as its
sugarcane ethanol counterpart. This view predicts that
Midwestern corn ethanol producers could become leading
cellulosic ethanol producers by transitioning from cornstarch
biomass to corn stover.267
Yet, even if cellulosic ethanol production were to be as
geographically concentrated as sugarcane ethanol production,
cellulosic ethanol production could use water more efficiently
than sugarcane ethanol production. Specifically, producing
cellulosic ethanol using the cellulosic biomass miscanthus x
giganteus could raise fewer water use concerns than producing
sugarcane ethanol. 268
4. Possible Environmental Effects
Finally, when compared to sugarcane ethanol production,
cellulosic ethanol production could emit fewer air pollutants
than sugarcane ethanol. While the literature addressing the
environmental effects of cellulosic ethanol production are silent
as to whether the production could emit an alarming amount of
air pollutants, the literature addressing sugarcane ethanol
production does mention the air pollutant emission issue.
Specifically, sugarcane ethanol production is related to a higher

264. See supra text accompanying notes 119–21.
265. See supra text accompanying note 111.
266. Wald, Milestone Claimed, supra note 116 (Florida); see supra text
accompanying note 75 (Iowa and Kansas).
267. See supra text accompanying note 78 (citing a commentator positing
that cellulosic ethanol may be mainly produced by current Midwestern corn
ethanol industry actors).
268. Compare supra text accompanying note 114 (efficient water use), with
supra text accompanying note 182 (water depletion).
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rate of respiratory ailments among younger and older
populations.269
D. INSPIRATIONS FOR THE U.S. CELLULOSIC ETHANOL INDUSTRY
To review, some of the literature addressing U.S. and
Brazilian ethanol could be relevant to the U.S. cellulosic
ethanol industry, the tax benefits of the United States and
Brazil are somewhat different, and the United States could
experience some environmental gains if it were to spur
cellulosic ethanol production. A question remains: what are the
tax benefits to best spur cellulosic ethanol production?
1. Proposed Changes for the Internal Revenue Code
For the United States to adopt tax benefits more like those
in place in Brazil, the IRC could be changed in at least some of
four ways.270 First, the benefits could address cellulosic ethanol
more explicitly, rather than addressing cellulosic ethanol by
lumping it along with other advanced fuels.
Second, Congress could eliminate the present tax benefits’
sunset provisions, rather than just extending the provisions’
dates through subsequent amendments.
Third, Congress could draft provisions where cellulosic
ethanol producers receive indirect tax benefits through
provisions that treat gasoline and cellulosic ethanol producers
differently. For example, the IRC could have a tax benefit
where gasoline producers’ aggregate revenue was to be taxed at
a higher rate than the aggregate revenue of cellulosic ethanol
producers.271
Fourth, the tax benefits could offer more information about
the use of the revenue collected, rather than only referring to
the kind of taxpayer involved. For instance, the IRC provisions
that designate cellulosic ethanol plants’ depreciation bonus
could indicate whether the provisions affect any specific federal
funds.272

269. See supra text accompanying notes 170–71.
270. The option for the United States to repeal its blender’s credit is not
completely on point because Brazil repealed its blender’s credit only last
December. See supra text accompanying notes 150, 154.
271. See supra text accompanying notes 151–52 (describing the Brazilian
PIS/PASEP tax where gasoline producers have a higher tax rate than ethanol
producers).
272. The Brazilian ethanol tax benefits relate to funds addressing
government projects regarding transportation fuels and resources, employee
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2. The Merits of the Proposed Changes
Adopting any one of the changes may not cause a boom in
the cellulosic ethanol industry,273 but some changes are more
likely to spur cellulosic ethanol production than others.
a. Elimination of Sunset Provisions
The elimination of sunset provisions could be the most
effective at spurring cellulosic ethanol production for at least
two reasons. This change in tax benefits could encourage
greater commitment from cellulosic ethanol producers and
could attract more industry investors.274 As the development of
Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol industry shows, even with some
indirect government support, the ethanol industry may be
driven to modernize itself.275
Additionally, the elimination of sunset provisions could be
more effective than other cellulosic ethanol industry incentives.
Unlike formal public-private collaborations, the elimination of
sunset provisions is less likely to be shunned by political
opponents. Opponents would be unlikely to decry that this
elimination is an act of favoritism, because the government
would only provide the benefits if cellulosic ethanol production
occurred.276

pensions, and social security. See supra text accompanying notes 147, 149,
153.
273. See Potter, supra note 6, at 345–51 (analyzing the developments of
U.S. corn ethanol and Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol to conclude that “[t]he
United States is not without hope, but neither is it in an enviable position”).
But see Cassuto & Gueiros, supra note 4, at 496–98 (listing reasons and
expounding on why “reproducing Brazil’s ethanol success in the United States
would be virtually impossible”).
274. Cf. Robert F. Service, Is There a Road Ahead for Cellulosic Ethanol?,
329 SCIENCE 784, 785 (2010) (“‘Until the government makes it absolutely clear
that [cellulosic tax benefits are] a long-term policy, investors will be reluctant
to support the [cellulosic ethanol] industry.’” (quoting Sean O’Hanlon,
executive director of the American Biofuels Council in Miami, Florida)).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 135–39 (explaining that industry
drive, along with E22 mandates, and other factors, helped Brazil’s ethanol
industry to recover); see also Potter, supra note 6, at 336 (“[D]espite
that . . . sugar and ethanol industries experienced difficult times [in the
1990s], instead of folding, both industries chose to cut costs and improve
production efficiency.”).
276. See supra text accompanying notes 225–29 (arguing that policies that
require public-private collaborations will likely be killed by the political
process).
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b. More Information About Revenue Expenditure
The change that requires tax benefits provisions to provide
more information about the use of the revenue being collected
could be effective because the change could facilitate the
political deliberative process. This measure would make the
resulting provision more transparent, and thus, the legislators
debating the provision are less likely to dispute that the
expressed end result is really a pretense. In the American
Taxpayer Relief Act of 2012’s Senate Finance Committee, a
sticking point between the majority and the minority in
enacting the 2012 cellulosic ethanol tax benefits was whether
the benefits would really benefit the U.S. economy and not only
a few private interests.277 Thus, if the IRC were to clarify how
part of its revenue could affect a specific federal fund, such as a
fund allotted for employee pensions, a group of congresspersons
would be less likely to allege that the others really intend to
curry favor with private interests.278
c. Differential Treatment of Gasoline and Cellulosic Ethanol
Producers
The taxing of gasoline producers at relatively higher rates
could, in theory, also spur cellulosic ethanol production because
that tax measure could provide cellulosic ethanol a comparative
advantage.279 Moreover, insofar as eliminating the cellulosic
tax benefits’ sunset provisions could result in a shortage in tax
revenue, the revenue collected from the gasoline industry could
make the difference. That said, it is possible that the U.S.
political deliberative process could vote off the measure of
taxing one industry at a higher rate than the other because

277. S. REP. NO. 112-208, at 112 (2012) (“The tax code should not be used
as a tool for picking winners and losers, nor should it reward politically
favored industries or penalize disfavored ones.”); see supra text accompanying
note 228.
278. Cf. Donald B. Susswein, Managing Our Energy Addiction: A Road
Map, 115 TAX NOTES 659, 663 (2007) (proposing a tax framework to
discourage gasoline use, and explaining that the framework would be
acceptable to Democrats because, for example, the framework addresses
climate change; and also acceptable to Republicans because, for example, the
framework reduces payroll taxes).
279. See Service, supra note 274, at 784–85 (citing an economist who
argued for tax benefits favoring cellulosic ethanol over gasoline because the
economist viewed such benefits as an opportunity for the cellulosic ethanol
industry to “become competitive and established”).
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legislators could perceive the measure as a blatant preferential
treatment.280
d. Explicitly Addressing Cellulosic Ethanol
A measure that amends the tax benefits to make them
more explicit so that they aim at cellulosic ethanol may not be
effective in spurring cellulosic ethanol production. If the IRC
bills were to benefit cellulosic ethanol expressly and not other
advanced biofuels, such provisions would draw attention to the
view that the sponsors or supporters only intend to favor
private interests and not the American population as a
whole.281 Unfortunately, these views need not have a strong
foundation in order to frustrate the enactment of the tax
benefits.282
3. Application of the Proposed Changes to the U.S. Cellulosic
Ethanol Industry
An increase in cellulosic ethanol production facilitated by
adopting tax benefits akin to those ethanol benefits in place in
Brazil could have meaningful environmental benefits in the
United States for two reasons. First, in some ways cellulosic
ethanol is environmentally on a par with the world’s reigning
ethanol,283 Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol. Second, increasing the
production of cellulosic ethanol in the United States would
have more comparative environmental benefits than the
dominant ethanol in the United States,284 corn ethanol.
Overall, the environmental effects of cellulosic ethanol
production are unlikely to be more detrimental than those of
sugarcane ethanol production. Cellulosic ethanol production
most likely raises fewer land use concerns than sugarcane

280. See Klass, Tax Benefits, supra note 10, at 14 (discussing the
prevalence among economists of taxing “fossil fuel productions,” noting the
merits of the tax approach, but concluding that “there does not appear to be
any appetite in Congress for a fossil fuel” tax); cf. supra text accompanying
notes 225–29 (discussing the legislature’s rejection of a bill favoring one
industry over other industries, but in the agribusiness context).
281. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 56–57 (describing commentary that
implicated corn ethanol production in special interests in policymaking).
282. Cf. supra note 212 and accompanying text (describing the U.S.
government decision making as “cumbersome”).
283. See supra note 6 and accompanying text (listing reasons why
sugarcane ethanol is perceived as successful).
284. See supra text accompanying notes 21–24.
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ethanol production.285 Additionally, even if cellulosic ethanol
production does not fare better than sugarcane ethanol
production in terms of lower GHG emissions, fewer threats to
biodiversity, and air pollution emissions, the literature does not
conclude that cellulosic ethanol production is worse.286
Even if the overall environmental benefits of cellulosic
ethanol production could not surpass those of sugarcane
ethanol, cellulosic ethanol would still fare better than corn
ethanol.287 The comparative environmental gains of cellulosic
ethanol production over that of corn ethanol apply to GHG
emissions,288 land use concerns,289 and potentially air pollutant
emissions.290
CONCLUSION
A society reliant on motor fuel should not expect to fill up
its gas tank at the expense of the environment. The United
States’ reliance on motor fuel raises the concern of whether
motor fuel could be produced while placing a lesser strain on
the environment. While the United States already has an
established corn ethanol industry that is a player in the motor
fuel mix, corn ethanol is not regarded, especially in terms of
environmental impact, as being on the same level playing field
as Brazilian sugarcane ethanol. Recently, the cellulosic ethanol
industry emerged as a potential fuel in the U.S. motor fuel
market. Therefore, the cellulosic ethanol’s emergence raises an

285. See supra text accompanying notes 263–68.
286. See supra text accompanying notes 250–60, 269.
287. This proposition assumes that cellulosic ethanol’s environmental
impact is not being compared against imported sugarcane ethanol. See
generally Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1080–85
(9th Cir. 2013) (explaining California’s Fuel Standard, which seeks to measure
the total carbon intensity of different varieties of domestic and foreign
ethanol).
288. Compare supra text accompanying notes 58–62 (describing several
studies that note that corn ethanol is ineffective in reducing GHG emissions),
with supra text accompanying notes 102–06 (describing studies that show a
mixed view on the effectiveness of cellulosic ethanol in reducing GHG
emissions).
289. See supra text accompanying notes 111–13 (pointing to ways cellulosic
biomass raises fewer land use concerns than corn).
290. Compare text accompanying notes 63–68 (suggesting that corn
ethanol may not be effective in combating air pollution), with text
accompanying note 269 (stating that literature on cellulosic ethanol
production is silent as to whether the production could emit alarming amounts
of air pollutants).
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issue of whether the cellulosic ethanol industry could learn
some lessons from the Brazilian sugarcane ethanol industry
model.
An inquiry into Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol industry tax
benefits sheds light on several ways Congress could change the
cellulosic ethanol industry tax benefits, which could ultimately
result in significant environmental gains. The past scholarship
has not specifically examined Brazil’s sugarcane ethanol
industry tax benefits, or recognized the United States’
cellulosic ethanol industry as a potential market player. Yet,
after probing into the relevant Brazilian tax benefits, there
emerge several ways that U.S. tax benefits could be changed
when addressing the cellulosic ethanol industry, such as the
elimination of sunset provisions and providing more
information about revenue expenditures. These tax-benefits
changes would result in an increase in the production of
cellulosic ethanol, which, especially when compared to the more
established corn ethanol, would result in significant
environmental benefits.

